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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4664 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
YAJAIRA NAVARRO, 
                                    Appellant 
_____________ 
       
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey                                                              
District Court  No. 1-09-cr-00703-002 
District Judge: The Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 12, 2012 
 
Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  January 12, 2012) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Yajaira Navarro was convicted in a jury trial of importing cocaine and 
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aiding and abetting in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(b)(2)(B) and 18 
U.S.C. § 2, and of conspiracy to import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 
952(a), 960(b)(2)(B), 963.  Navarro timely appeals from the District Court‟s 
judgment, claiming that the court erred:  (1) by admitting expert testimony as to the 
street value of the imported drugs; (2) by instructing the jury on willful blindness; 
and (3) by denying Navarro‟s motion for judgment of acquittal based on the 
insufficiency of the Government‟s evidence.1  We will affirm. 
 First, Navarro argues that the District Court should have excluded expert 
witness testimony about the street value of the imported cocaine both because the 
value of the drugs was not an element of the charged offenses, and because the 
testimony was unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.  We review 
the decision to admit expert evidence for an abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 269 (3d Cir. 2010).  We also review the decision to 
deny a Rule 403 objection for an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Kemp, 500 
F.3d 257, 295 (3d Cir. 2007).   
Although the value of the imported cocaine was not an element of the crime, 
it supported the Government‟s theory of the case—that “drug suppliers might be 
unwilling to entrust such valuable cargo to an ignorant courier, fearing that she 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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might be insufficiently motivated to ensure that it safely reaches its destination.”  
United States v. Ayala-Tapia, 520 F.3d 66, 68 (1st Cir. 2008).  The District Court 
thus did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony as “evidence that 
may assist the trier of fact.”  Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 
2008); see also Fed. R. Evid. 401, 702.  Because of the probative value of this 
testimony, the District Court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Navarro‟s 
Rule 403 objection.   
 Second, Navarro argues that the District Court erred by instructing the jury 
on willful blindness.  We review for an abuse of discretion.  Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 
at 252.  At trial, the Government provided evidence to support such an instruction 
by showing that Navarro‟s co-conspirator purchased an abnormal number of 
shampoo bottles on the last day of their trip, and that the bottles emitted a strong, 
chemical odor (later discovered to be due to the presence of cocaine).  This 
evidence could support the inference that Navarro “deliberately avoided „ask[ing] 
the natural follow-up question[s]‟ . . . despite [her] awareness of a high 
probability” that she was committing an illegal act.  Id. at 259 (quoting United 
States v. Wertz-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 257 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Moreover, even if no such 
instruction was warranted, any error was harmless given that “„the instruction itself 
contained the proper legal standard,‟” and that there was evidence from which the 
jury could infer that Navarro had knowledge of the contents of the bottles.  Id. at 
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260 n.26 (quoting United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 654 n.15 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 Finally, Navarro argues that the District Court erred by denying her motion 
for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.  Navarro 
argues that the Government provided insufficient evidence to show that Navarro 
had the requisite mental state to sustain either the importation charge or the 
conspiracy charge.  We “review[ ] the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government and must credit all available inferences in favor of the 
government.”  United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998).  If a 
rational juror could have concluded that the Government proved its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we must sustain the verdict.  United States v. Cartwright, 359 
F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2004). 
While the record does not contain a “mountain of evidence,” as claimed by 
the Government, it contains sufficient circumstantial evidence to allow a rational 
trier of fact to conclude that Navarro agreed to the conspiracy, and that she knew 
that the shampoo bottles contained cocaine.  Specifically, a rational juror could 
have inferred an agreement and the requisite mental state from the Government‟s 
evidence that: (1) Navarro‟s expedited passport application was paid for by an 
unidentified third party; (2) Navarro lied on her expedited passport application 
about the purpose of her trip to Costa Rica; (3) Navarro was aware that her co-
conspirator purchased an abnormally large number of large shampoo bottles on the 
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last full day of a three night trip; (4) the bottles emitted a strong chemical odor and 
contained a thick, pasty substance; (5) identical bottles were found both in 
Navarro‟s luggage and in her co-conspirator‟s luggage, filled with approximately 
the same amount of cocaine; and (6) Navarro‟s demeanor instantly changed when 
Customs and Border Patrol began to inspect the bottles—her face turned pale, she 
was wringing her hands, her legs were shaking, and she looked “very worried.”  
We will affirm. 
 
 
